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The capacity to learn new information and manipulate it for efficient retrieval has long been
studied through reasoning paradigms, which also has applicability to the study of social
behavior. Humans can learn about the linear order within groups using reasoning, and the
success of such reasoning may vary according to affective state, such as depression. We
investigated the neural basis of these latter findings using functional neuroimaging. Using
BDI-II criteria, 14 non-depressed (ND) and 12 mildly depressed volunteers took part in a
linear-order reasoning task during functional magnetic resonance imaging. The hippocam-
pus, parietal, and prefrontal cortices were activated during the task, in accordance with
previous studies. In the learning phase and in the test phase, greater activation of the pari-
etal cortex was found in the depressed group, which may be a compensatory mechanism
in order to reach the same behavioral performance as the ND group, or evidence for a
different reasoning strategy in the depressed group.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental ability in both humans and animals is the capacity
to flexibly learn new information and to recall and manipulate that
information for future use (Simons and Spiers, 2003; Manns and
Eichenbaum, 2006). Indeed, both humans and animals can flexibly
make novel inferences from the information provided (Dickins,
2005; Vasconcelos, 2008). This process is often studied through
linear-order reasoning paradigms (Potts, 1972; Sternberg, 1980),
in which participants learn A>B and B>C; evidence of reason-
ing occurs when they can rearrange the incoming information into
a coherent representation, or mental model, in order to infer that
A>C. This type of reasoning is not purely an abstract cognitive
process, however, but one which has applications in the environ-
ment; for example, animals use this type of processing to learn
their place in the social order of their groups (Hogue et al., 1996;
Paz-Y-Miño et al., 2004). Humans can learn about rank orders
within groups of people using linear-order reasoning, and the suc-
cess of such reasoning may depend on affective state, particularly,
sub-clinical depression (Sedek and Von Hecker, 2004). Previous
research has found dysfunctions in the frontoparietal network in
depressed participants [for an overview see Brzezicka (2013)]. In
particular, Thomas and Elliott (2009), as well as Hugdahl et al.
(2004) found in their depressed participants that reduced parietal
activity was associated with impaired performance in mental arith-
metic tasks, as well as hyperactivity was associated with intact per-
formance, leading these authors to conclude that normal perfor-
mance in depression is associated with enhanced cortical, in partic-
ular parietal, function during reasoning. In this study, we use func-
tional MRI to investigate how brain activation during execution of
a different reasoning task, that is, linear-order construction, might
be altered in the brain, especially in parietal cortical areas, when
individuals are in a state of sub-clinical depression.
There is an increasing literature on the neural basis of linear
order, or transitive, reasoning [e.g., Christoff et al. (2001), Goel
and Dolan (2001, 2003, 2004), Acuna et al. (2002), Knauff et al.
(2002), Fangmeier et al. (2006), Greene et al. (2006), Monti et al.
(2007), Van Opstal et al. (2008), Wendelken et al. (2008)]. Studies
to date have largely taken an abstract form in the tasks employed
to reveal the underlying brain activation of making inferences.
A review of the above literature demonstrates that a “network”
of brain regions subserve reasoning, including the hippocampus,
parietal, and prefrontal cortices. Knauff et al. (2002) found that an
occipital–parietal–frontal network was activated during relational
reasoning, which includes areas in the visuospatial system. In line
with this research, we suggest that spatial processing of relations
is paramount to processing orders or hierarchies in order to solve
reasoning problems (Leth-Steensen and Marley, 2000). Specifi-
cally, the present study will look into the areas of intra-parietal
sulcus, inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), and posterior parietal lobe
(BA 7) as earlier work has suggested that these regions might
be involved in tasks involving spatial and numerical operations,
as well as working memory [e.g., D’Esposito et al. (1998), Sakai
et al. (1998), Pinel et al. (2001)], and, more specifically, in the spa-
tial operations during transitive inference (Goel and Dolan, 2001;
Acuna et al., 2002; Knauff et al., 2002). Furthermore, the role of the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) in reasoning has been highlighted in stud-
ies of relational complexity and integration (Christoff et al., 2001;
Acuna et al., 2002; Kroger et al., 2002; Wendelken et al., 2008).
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In the present study, rather than employing abstract symbols
in the task, we focus on more naturalistic linear-orders regarding
relationships within small sets of people. During functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), participants learned a series of
pairwise information, such as “Andrew is taller than Brian,”“Brian
is taller than Colin,” and “Colin is taller than David.” Evidence
suggests that people spontaneously rearrange the three presented
pairs of information and integrate them into a coherent men-
tal model (≥“taller”): A>B>C>D, most likely involving spatial
representations (Huttenlocher, 1968; Waltz et al., 1999). After the
learning phase, test queries were asked about all possible pairs of
names, such as the three presented ones, i.e., A/B, B/C, C/D, and
also queries about those relations that were not presented during
learning, such as A/C, B/D (an inference spanning two distance
steps along the assumed mental model), and A/D (involving two
inferences, and corresponding to three distance steps along the
model).
There is some evidence to suggest that transitive reasoning is
affected by sub-clinical depression (Sedek and Von Hecker, 2004).
Such reasoning deficits may lie at the heart of some cognitive
problems found in those with depression, such as loss of creativity
and inferior ability to solve problems in the social domain (Gotlib
and Hammen, 1992; Marx et al., 1992; von Hecker and Sedek,
1999). Depressed participants showed inferior performance as
compared to non-depressed (ND) controls in the linear-order task
as described above, especially concerning the inferred pairs (Sedek
and Von Hecker, 2004, Exp. 1, 3, and 4). The authors suggested
that while ND individuals might create the comprehensive model
A>B>C>D spontaneously during learning, depressed individ-
uals might not do so (or not be successful in doing so), but engage
in reasoning more upon particular queries during the test phase,
this resulting in a less efficient processing overall. The present
hypothesis, therefore, is that compared to those without depres-
sion, individuals in depressed states may show higher indices of
brain activation in the spatial areas supporting transitive reason-
ing as described above, when tested on queries of any pair distance
across the linear-order A>B>C>D.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Female participants were recruited into this study on the basis
of their score on the Beck depression inventory-II (Beck et al.,
1996). Only females were recruited for this study, as there is a
greater prevalence of depression in females (Nolen-Hoeksema,
2002). Participants attended one or two sessions. In the first ses-
sion, participants were given the BDI and CED depression scales,
and the operation span (OSPAN) and digital symbol substitution
test (DSST) tasks (see below for details). Participants who fitted
the BDI criteria for the ND or D groups in the first session were
asked to attend a second session 1 week later. In the second session,
participants were given both depression scales again. If their scores
allowed them to remain in their original group classification, they
immediately took part in the imaging phase. If not, the reasons
for them not continuing onto the imaging session were given, and
they were thanked and debriefed. For the ND group, those with
a score of 5 or below, on two occasions 1 week apart, were cho-
sen (n= 17). Those with a score of 13 or above, on two occasions
1 week apart, were included in the mildly depressed (D) group
(n= 15). Participants were given a second depression scale (Center
for Epidemilogic Studies Depression scale, CES-D, Radloff, 1977)
in the second session, on which participants had to get a score of
16 or above to remain in the D group.
Data from three participants from the D group and three from
the ND group had to be excluded from the analysis either due to
excessive movement in the scanner or misunderstanding the task
instructions. Twenty-six participants remained in the analysis: 14
in the ND group and 12 in the D group. Table 1 summarizes
the group demographics. All participants indicated that they were
right-handed, none had any history of psychiatric or neurological
disorders, and none were currently taking psychotrophic med-
ications. All participants gave informed consent. This study was
approved by the Cardiff School of Psychology Ethics Committee.
BEHAVIORAL TASKS AND DESIGN
During the fMRI, a mixed block/sparse event-related design was
used to present the linear-order reasoning task (Figure 1). As
described above, participants were shown information regard-
ing the relationships between four people (A>B>C>D), upon
which they were then tested. In the initial learning phase, presented
as a block, participants were sequentially shown three sentences
for 10 s each, followed by 30 s of fixation to a cross (X). Partic-
ipants were asked to remember the names and the relationships
between them, e.g., of one set (1) Andrew is taller than Brian
(A>B) (2) Brian is taller than Colin (B>C) (3) Colin is taller than
David (C>D). Other relational terms included “older,” “richer,”
“smarter,”“braver,” and “faster” (18 in total). Relational pairs were
presented in equal numbers of one of two order types: (i) where
the pairs are presented in the order in which they appear in the
putative model (e.g., A>B, B>C, C>D), or (ii) where the rela-
tions appear in a different order to the model (e.g., B>C, A>B,
C>D), in order to assess whether the latter required differential
brain activity to support the greater cognitive demands to support
the integration of pairs. A test phase followed in which a query sen-
tence was presented for 4.5 s followed by 10 s of fixation to allow
the BOLD response to return to baseline between events. Three
query sentences were presented in each test phase: One sentence
was randomly chosen from those presented in the learning phase
Table 1 | Participant information.
Non-depressed
group (ND)
Depressed
group (D)
N 14 12
Age (years) 22.6 (3.9) 22.7 (5.7)
BDI-II at time 1 2.3 (1.6) 16.6 (2.9)*
BDI-II at time 2 (imaging) 0.9 (1.1) 20.6 (7.0)*
CES-D at time 2 (imaging) 1.7 (2.2) 23.9 (6.9)*
DSST score 48.4 (6.8) 48.7 (10.1)
OSPAN words score (WM) 11.9 (6.3) 12.0 (7.8)
OSPAN maths score 37.2 (5.2) 37.4 (2.7)
(SD given in brackets) *indicates a significant difference at the level of p<0.05
using an independent groups t test.
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FIGURE 1 | Design of the study.
(“one step” queries, A>B, B>C, or C>D, equivalent to one step
(A to B) on the hypothetical mental model), one sentence was
randomly chosen from “two-step” queries (A>C, B>D), and the
end-point query was presented (A>D). The queries were either
presented in correct or incorrect format (e.g., Andrew is taller than
Brian, or Brian is taller than Andrew). Participants had to respond
whether or not the query content was correct on the basis of the
information learned about the group of people in the learning
phase. Twelve sets of stimuli were presented in three imaging runs
of four sets. The format of the test phase queries were pseudo-
randomized such that over the course of the three runs there were
an equal number (12) of each type of query (one step, two step, and
end point), and an equal number of correctly (6),and incorrectly
presented trials (6). Total scan time was approximately 30 min,
followed by an anatomical brain scan for a further 10 min.
Data from the reasoning task were analyzed using ANOVA.
The dependent measures were the percentage of correct responses
and response time (within the 4.5 s window) to each query type
(one step, two step, and end point). Following the imaging session,
participants were given a post-imaging questionnaire, designed to
ascertain how participants reported doing the task. Participants
were also given an OSPAN task (Turner and Engle, 1989) as a
measure of working memory capacity, and the DSST, a subset of
the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981), as a measure of processing speed.
There were no significant differences between the groups on these
two control measures (see Table 1 for means; OSPAN t =−0.031,
p> 0.05; DSST t =−0.071, p> 0.05), so any differences found on
the reasoning task cannot be attributed to differences in processing
speed or working memory capacity.
IMAGE ACQUISITION
Anatomical and functional images were acquired at the Cardiff
University Brain Research Imaging Center (CUBRIC), using
a General Electric Excite-HDx 3 T MRI scanner. Functional
images were collected using a gradient-echo echo-planar pulse
sequence (TE= 35 ms; TR= 2500 ms; flip angle= 90°; acquisition
matrix= 64× 64; field of view (FOV) 64× 64; in plane resolution
3.75 mm). The volumes covered the whole brain in 37 slices
(thickness 3.8 mm) and were acquired in line with the anterior
commissure/posterior commissure line. A total of 684 volumes
were acquired for each participant in 3 sessions of 228 volumes
each. In each run of 228 volumes, 3 sets of stimuli were presented.
For each set (as described above, see Figure 1 for presentation
timing of one set of stimuli), a learning phase of 3 premise pair
sentences (e.g., A>B, B>C, C>D), each presented for 10 s, was
followed by a fixation cross for 30 s. The test phase then imme-
diately followed with 3 test queries (4.5 s each), each followed
by 10 s fixation. A filler task (counting backwards for 30 s) was
given to participants between each set in order to reduce pos-
sible interference between sets of relations. This results in 12
block scans for analysis of the learning phase, and 12 one-step,
12 two-step, and 12 end-point test queries for analysis of the test
phase. The timing of the program in presentation was designed
such that the test queries were not presented until a pulse had
been received by the scanner. This ensured that the task was
always in synchrony with the scanner. Finally, a high-resolution
T1-weighted FSPGR anatomical image was acquired (TR= 7.9 s;
TE= 3 ms; inversion time= 450 ms; flip angle= 20°; acquisition
matrix 256× 256× 176; FOV 256× 256× 176, resulting in 1 mm
isotropic voxels).
IMAGE ANALYSIS
Data was analyzed using the FSL package from FMRIB, University
of Oxford (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/). For each participant,
data were acquired in three runs. At the first level, each run
was pre-processed and analyzed separately, using the following
stages: motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002),
non-brain removal using BET (Smith, 2002), spatial smoothing
using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 5 mm, mean-based intensity
normalization of all volumes, and high-pass temporal filtering.
Time-series statistical analysis was carried out using FILM with
local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich et al., 2001). The first
level modeled nine explanatory variables (EVs) for learning phase
order 1 and 2, the filler task between sets, one-step, two-step, and
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end-point test queries presented in the correct or incorrect for-
mat. Contrasts compared: (1) learning phase to baseline, (2) the
two different order of premises in the learning phase, (3) each test
query type to baseline, (4) one-step to two-step queries, and (5)
presented (one step) vs. inferred queries (two step and end point).
At the second level, the separate runs were combined into a fixed
analysis for each person, and then finally data from all participants
was combined in a third level analysis for each contrast. Higher-
level group analysis was carried out using a mixed effects group
analysis – FLAME (stage 1 only) (Beckmann et al., 2003; Woolrich
et al., 2004). Z statistic images were thresholded using Gaussian
random field (GRF)-theory based maximum cluster thresholding
with a corrected significance threshold of p= 0.05 (Worsley et al.,
1992). Registration to high resolution and standard images was
carried out using FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001; Jenkinson
et al., 2002).
The study was designed to examine differences between groups
(ND and D) and between test relation types (one step, two step,
and end point). For the learning phase data, contrasts examined
(i) activation during the learning phase compared to baseline (fix-
ation cross) between the two groups, and (ii) activation during
the learning phase for each order of presented relations, using a
whole-brain corrected cluster-based threshold (z > 2.3, p< 0.05).
A subsequent analysis repeated (i), but for both groups together.
When reporting data for both groups together a stricter thresh-
old (z > 5) was chosen due to the large extent of activation found
when simply comparing task to fixation baseline.
For the test phase data, only correctly answered trials were
included in the analysis. This resulted in 5.3% of the total num-
ber of trials being excluded from the analysis. Contrasts examined
(iii) each test query type compared to baseline across groups, (iv)
previously presented queries compared to queries requiring infer-
ence, and most importantly (v) between group differences for each
test query type (one step, two step, and end point). The MNI coor-
dinate system is used in the results section when reporting the
activation peaks.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
Reasoning accuracy
The percentage of correct responses to the test queries is shown in
Figure 2A. The main effect of pair distance (step) was significant
(F2,48= 5.061, p= 0.01), with accuracy increasing from one step
queries to end-point queries. However, there were no significant
differences in task accuracy between mood groups, between neigh-
boring distances (one step/two step or two step/end point), or any
interaction between group and pair distance.
Response times data
A significant stepwise decrease in reaction time was found across
query types of increasing pair distance (F2,48= 11.30, p< 0.001) –
see Figure 2B. Pairwise comparisons showed that end-point
queries needed significantly less time than two-step queries
(p= 0.005), while the difference between one-step and two-step
queries was not significant. There was also no significant differ-
ence between mood groups or any interaction between group and
pair distance.
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral data. (A) Mean accuracy scores (percentage of
correct responses) and (B) mean response time in seconds for each test
query type (one step, two step, or end point) and for each group
(non-depressed or depressed).
Questionnaire responses
All 26 participants reported, without prompting, that they had
ordered the people in each set according to the relation speci-
fied between them, during the learning phase. Twenty-four out of
26 participants reported verbally rehearsing the correct order of
the people in each set during the fixation between the learning and
test phases; of the remaining participants, 1 reported using a purely
visual strategy, and the other reported simply fixating on the cross.
NEUROIMAGING DATA
Learning phase
No significant differences were found in the whole-brain analyses
brain activation between D and ND groups, while the partic-
ipants were learning the relations between the people in each
group. Moreover, no significant differences were found according
to the order of presenting the relational pairs. As such, the fol-
lowing results are reported including all 26 participants and both
order types using a whole-brain corrected cluster-based threshold
(z > 5, p< 0.05). A distributed network of areas was activated in
association with the learning phase of the task relative to fixation
(see Table S1 in Supplementary Material), including prefrontal
and parietal cortex, hippocampus, as well as occipital cortex and
cerebellum. (NB. Post hoc ROI analyses of the learning phase are
presented below).
Test phase
First, to investigate the basic pattern of activation associated with
the test phase queries, an average map of the activation found in
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association with each type of test query relative to fixation (one
step, two step, end point) for both D and ND groups together
is reported, which revealed a similar pattern across the query
types. For summary purposes, Table S2 in Supplementary Mate-
rial contains the results from all 26 participants together, using a
whole-brain corrected cluster-based threshold (z > 5, p< 0.05).
In order to examine, which areas were involved in making infer-
ences, a further comparison was made between the response to
test relations involving making an inference (two-step and end-
point relations) and those involving one-step relations that would
require recalling the previously presented information from the
learning phase. A significant difference in brain activation between
inferred and presented queries was found in the ND group only,
using a whole-brain corrected cluster-based threshold (z > 2.3,
p< 0.05). As shown in Figure 3, greater activation was found
in the superior and medial frontal cortex in association with
inferred queries (e.g., A>C, A>D) compared to the previously
presented queries (e.g., A>B). The same regions were not sig-
nificantly differentially activated in the depressed group for the
same contrast. However, the direct comparison between groups
did not reach significance [ND(inferred-presented)−D(inferred-
presented)]. It is possible that the frontal cortex was activated
more to inferred queries than presented queries in the depressed
group as well, but that this difference in activation did not reach
significance1.
One of the key contrasts of interest in this study was to
investigate differences in activation in response to the differ-
ent test relations, relative to fixation, between the D and ND
groups [D(test-fixation)−ND(test-fixation)]. Activation associ-
ated with each test query was analyzed between groups, using a
whole-brain corrected cluster-based threshold (z > 2.3, p< 0.05).
A significantly different pattern of activation was found in the pari-
etal lobe/post-central gyrus for end-point and one-step queries
between groups (D–ND), as shown in Figure 4A (end point),
Figure 4C (one step). For end-point queries, foci were found in
superior parietal cortex (26, −46, 60, z = 3.72), supramarginal
gyrus/post-central gyrus (x = 44, y =−26, z = 40, Z = 3.76). For
one-step queries, foci were found in the parietal lobe (post-central
gyrus x = 60, y =−12, z = 20, Z = 3.95; 58, −1, 46, z = 3.87).
Figure 4B (end point) and Figure 4D (one step) show how activ-
ity in these regions varies as a function of BDI-II score. These
scatter-plots show that on average the ND group shows relative
deactivation in these regions, whereas the D group show activa-
tion. A similar pattern of activation was found in the two-step
contrast as for the other test query types (as shown in Table S2
in Supplementary Material above), and a D–ND difference was
found for two-step queries in the same areas as for end-point and
one-step queries after lowering the threshold slightly, suggesting
that any difference between the groups did not quite survive the
cluster threshold for two-step queries.
1We thank the reviewer for pointing out that the inferred vs. presented contrast
can be difficult to interpret since the recall can interfere with the model creation
and the inference process. Maybe the participants hold the premises in mind and
rehearse them more or less extensively, which may interfere with later stages of
model creation.
FIGURE 3 | Activation map for inferred queries compared to previously
presented queries in ND group. Activation shown in medial frontopolar
cortex (BA 10, peak −4, 64, 14, z =3.26) and superior frontal cortex (BA8,
peak −26, 32, 50, z =3.63) in the contrast between inferred queries (two
step and end point) compared to previously presented queries (one step), in
the non-depressed group only. Cluster-based threshold: z >2.3, p<0.05.
To attempt to further understand the nature of these dif-
ferences, correlations were performed between activity during
end-point and one-step queries in the regions showing a sig-
nificant difference between groups, and performance on the task
(Figure 5). A significant negative correlation was found in the D
group between activity and response times to end-point queries
(r =−0.579, p= 0.048). The longer the response time, the less
activity was found in the parietal regions showing a difference
between groups. As Figure 5 shows, this correlation was only
found in the D group, with no such relationship in the ND group
(r =−0.009, p= 0.975).
Given the difference in the parietal cortex response between
groups during the test phase, further post hoc analyses were con-
ducted in order to test for differences during the learning phase in
this parietal region. Two separate masks of the parietal activation
showing differences between the D and ND groups in response
to one-step and end-point queries were created. In two separate
analyses, these were inputted into the learning phase group feat
analysis using pre-threshold masking. For both types of queries
(one step and end point), the D group do show significant acti-
vation in the corresponding parietal region during the learning
phase, whereas the ND group do not. The contrast between the
two groups (D–ND) does show a significant difference in this
region of the parietal cortex during the learning phase (x = 48,
y =−28, z = 40, Z = 3.5). The same activation peak during the
learning phase was seen using the one-step and end-point parietal
cortex masks, as these masks almost entirely overlap.
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FIGURE 4 | Differences between D–ND groups for end-point and one-step
queries. This figure shows the significantly different pattern of activation
found in the parietal lobe/post-central gyrus for end-point and one-step
queries between groups (D–ND): (A) for end-point queries, foci were found in
superior parietal cortex (26, −46, 60, z =3.72), supramarginal
gyrus/post-central gyrus (44, −26, 40, z =3.76); (B) shows how activation in
each group during end-point queries varied according to BDI-II score; (C) for
one-step queries, foci were found in the parietal lobe (post-central gyrus 60,
−12, 20, z =3.95; 58, −1, 46, z =3.87); (D) shows how activation in each
group during one-step queries varied according to BDI-II score.
DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that linear-order reasoning is an effective strat-
egy when learning about, and reasoning with, naturalistic orders
in humans. Moreover, hippocampal, parietal, and prefrontal cor-
tical activations during the task provide corroborative evidence
for a network of regions associated with reasoning found in previ-
ous studies (Christoff et al., 2001; Acuna et al., 2002; Knauff et al.,
2002; Goel and Dolan, 2004; Schubotz et al., 2004; Fangmeier et al.,
2006; Greene et al., 2006; Wendelken et al., 2008). In accordance
with our hypotheses, greater activation was shown by the mildly
depressed group compared to the ND group in spatial areas sup-
porting transitive reasoning, namely the parietal cortex, during
the spatial-like operations of solving the reasoning queries. This
may be a compensatory mechanism in order to reach the same
behavioral performance as the ND group [see Thomas and Elliott
(2009), Brzezicka (2013)], or evidence for a different reasoning
strategy in the depressed group. In post hoc analyses, correspond-
ing differences in parietal activation between the two groups were
also found for the learning phase.
DEPRESSED GROUP SHOW RELATIVELY GREATER PARIETAL
ACTIVATION DURING REASONING
When solving the test queries, the depressed group showed rel-
atively greater activation in the superior parietal lobe and in the
region of the supramarginal gyrus and post-central gyrus com-
pared to the ND group who showed relative deactivation during
the task (relative to baseline and the depressed group). Activa-
tion in the somatosensory cortices (post-central gyrus) is assumed
to reflect movement or non-task-related sensory feedback from
pressing the response button, in line with suggestions by Acuna
et al. (2002).
The greater activation in the parietal cortex during the test
phase in the depressed group may be more task-related. The pari-
etal lobe has been shown to be involved during mental operations
that require spatial manipulation of internal representations, such
as transitive inference (Goel and Dolan, 2001; Acuna et al., 2002;
Knauff et al., 2002; Monti et al., 2007). Recently, Waechter et al.
(2012) showed that patients with focal lesions in the parietal cor-
tex were significantly impaired on transitive reasoning tasks, as
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FIGURE 5 | Correlation in D group only between RT to end-point
queries and activation in regions in the D–ND contrast. A scattergram
plotting the reaction time during end-point queries against activation in
regions in the D–ND contrast in both groups. A significant negative
correlation between response time, after checking for outliers (none were
found) using the Tukey criterion (Clark-Carter, 2004, Chapter 9), and
activation during end-point trials was found in the D group (r =−0.579,
p=0.048; filled diamonds), but not ND group (r =−0.009, p=0.975; clear
squares).
compared to normal controls. It appears that the depressed group
required more activation than the ND group at test to make the
spatial aspects of the task sufficiently salient to arrive at the same
behavioral outcome. It should be noted, however, that by using
the contrast with fixation to examine the between group differ-
ences, this interpretation is not the only one possible. Greater
parietal lobe activation between depressed and ND in the par-
ticular contrast D(test-fixation)−ND(test-fixation) could either
reflect greater parietal lobe activation during the task (as stated),
but alternatively could reflect no change in task activation but a
greater deactivation during fixation in the depressed relative to the
ND. Future research should further examine these possibilities.
The longer the time the depressed group took to respond to the
test queries, the less activation was found in the parietal cortex. In
other words, the quicker the depressed individuals responded, the
more effort was indicated by brain activation. Given that this corre-
lation is based only on correct responses, it appears that depressed
participants needed to spend more effort to achieve quicker, cor-
rect responses, a correlation not found in the ND participants.
These results are in accordance with earlier behavioral findings
of Sedek and Von Hecker (2004). These authors suggested that
depressed individuals are not as successful or efficient in con-
structing a linear order during the learning stage, and so engage
in a different, compensatory style of reasoning when prompted by
a test query. By compensation we mean that the same region in
the brain may have to work harder in the depressed group than in
the ND control group, in order to achieve the same performance
level. This may be expected if depression is associated with more
difficulties in the early deployment of suitable strategies of task
execution and information integration (Hertel and Rude, 1991;
Sedek and Von Hecker, 2004).
Our argument follows the general logic that processing dis-
advantages can be indicated by the observation that in order to
achieve the same level of performance in a cognitive task, the dis-
advantaged group (in our case, depressed individuals) has to exert
relatively more mental effort than the non-disadvantaged group
(ND individuals). As such, this reasoning has previously been
applied to other domains within the literature on behavioral cor-
relates of cortical activation. For example, Fangmeier et al. (2006)
(Ruff et al., 2003) suggested that for individuals with high spatial
ability, the reasoning problems may have required less demand
for visuospatial processing such that less activity in the parietal
cortex was required to solve the problems, as compared to indi-
viduals with low spatial ability. In our case, the relative deactivation
shown in the ND group in this study may take this argument one
step further. A number of explanations for decreases in the BOLD
signal have been put forward, including suppression of task irrel-
evant activity or reallocation of resources [e.g., McKiernan et al.
(2003), Tomasi et al. (2006)], the default mode network (Raichle
et al., 2001; Singh and Fawcett, 2008), greater activity in the base-
line task than the task of interest (Gusnard et al., 2001; Stark and
Squire, 2001), or optimizing activity to focus task performance
(Astur and Constable, 2004; Rekkas et al., 2005). It is possible that
the deactivation seen in the ND group could be explained as opti-
mization of the activity in the parietal cortex, along the lines of
that suggested for hippocampal deactivation during a similar rela-
tional task (Astur and Constable, 2004), in which it was suggested
that inhibition was used to dampen irrelevant relations while the
representation of important relations remained. This would be in
line with the behavioral data, which suggests that retrieval of the
correct response is made easier through the use of an organized
mental array [see also Leth-Steensen and Marley (2000), Sedek
and Von Hecker (2004)]. It is possible that the ND group, after
successful construction of a mental array, tend to inhibit any addi-
tional (i.e., unnecessary) spatial processing that could interfere
with retrieval from the already existing representation.
The fact that in the post hoc analyses, the depressed, unlike
the ND, group displayed significant activation levels in the target
parietal region during the learning phase may be due to the char-
acteristics of the assumed process of mental model construction.
As argued earlier (Sedek and Von Hecker, 2004), depressed indi-
viduals may find such construction more difficult to do than ND
individuals. If it is further assumed that construction takes place
in the learning phase, and that spatial functions are involved in this
type of construction (Leth-Steensen and Marley, 2000), the more
intense recruitment of parietal regions in the depressed group
during learning appears plausible. It is further plausible to specu-
late that depressed individuals, more so than ND participants for
whom construction would be easier (and already accomplished
at the time of testing), would again recruit parietal regions more,
even at test, in their attempts to arrive at clear mental models of
the rankings2.
2We thank the reviewer who drew our attention to the possibility that part of the
reason why such parietal recruitment may be particularly required in depressed
individuals may be the fact that the premises for model construction, i.e., the one-
step pairs, are still rehearsed at test in the depressed, which would potentially entail
ongoing constructive effort during test, and as such would interfere with their quick
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While differential brain activity was found between groups dur-
ing the test phase and the learning phase, the behavioral results, and
the debriefing following scanning, did not show significant differ-
ences in performance between the depressed and the ND group, in
contrast to earlier findings (Sedek and Von Hecker, 2004). The dif-
ference in the results between this study and these earlier findings
could be due to differences in the paradigm arising from changes
needed to prepare the task for fMRI; for example, participants were
given extensive practice up to a criterion before being admitted to
the task, unlike in Sedek and Von Hecker (2004), so the lack of per-
formance differences may be due to a ceiling effect. Also, the timing
in the fMRI task provided participants with a fixed study time of
10 s when learning the relations as opposed to response-driven
timing, thereby providing more structure to the task, and possibly
helping to focus attention. Indeed, Hertel and Rude (1991) showed
that depressed participants exhibited performance deficits only in
task conditions where their attention remained unfocused during
task execution, but had normal performance when their attention
was focused by task constraints.
This discrepancy between the group differences showing the
neuroimaging results but not the behavioral data is not unprece-
dented. There is evidence to suggest that there are cognitive
impairments in depression that are only demonstrable using neu-
roimaging techniques. Several studies have shown comparable
performance on working memory and Stroop interference tasks
in depressed and control participants, but in association with
increased activation of the PFC in the depressed group (Wagner
et al., 2006; Matsuo et al., 2007; Walter et al., 2007). Explana-
tions for this differential brain activation include compensatory
recruitment of PFC resources to complete the task successfully
(Walter et al., 2007) and cortical inefficiency due to hyperactiv-
ity of key brain regions (Wagner et al., 2006). Smith et al. (2014)
induced effect in a within-participant design by having partici-
pants view positive, negative, and neutral picture stimuli. They
found that emotion did not impair logical reasoning, but that the
neural systems underlying such reasoning differed in activation
from those in the neutral condition. This dovetails with our finding
that equivalent levels of reasoning between depressed and ND par-
ticipants were associated with different activation levels in brain
areas known as underlying performance in the particular task.
GREATER PREFRONTAL ACTIVATION DURING INFERENCE
Several studies now suggest that the rostral PFC is important for
integration of relations into an internal representation (Christoff
et al., 2001; Kroger et al., 2002; Fangmeier et al., 2006; Van Opstal
et al., 2008; Wendelken et al., 2008). The results from the ND group
in this study clarify this further by suggesting that rostral medial
PFC (BA 8 and 10) activity is required when making novel infer-
ences by manipulating information within an integrated mental
model compared to recalling the answer to queries on previously
and efficient use of the mental model as a retrieval device. We agree. This possibility
is in line with earlier research showing that in non-depressed individuals, premises
of transitive mental models tend to be forgotten after successful construction (May-
berry et al., 1986), and that sad and depressed individuals tend to process detail
information meticulously, i.e., preserve behavioral information more than individ-
uals in neutral mood, when inferences from that information can be drawn (Gannon
et al., 1994; Yost and Weary, 1996).
presented relations. While some studies have found lateral RPFC
activity to be associated with relational integration (Christoff et al.,
2001; Wendelken et al., 2008), others have found medial RPFC
activation, including the present one (Fangmeier et al., 2006; Van
Opstal et al., 2008). In a review of models into the functions of
the anterior PFC (BA 10), Ramnani and Owen (2004) suggest that
the role of this region overall is “in integrating outcomes of two
or more separate cognitive operations in the pursuit of a higher
behavioral goal” (p. 1). The exact location of the activation found
could be a function of the particular task employed, the specific
cognitive processes required, sample recruited, stimuli used, and
so on.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
These results should be considered in light of the limitations of
the study. The study was designed to compare directly activation
between test queries or the learning phase, as well as between
groups, as such a fixation baseline was deemed adequate. More
specific findings relating to the learning phase, in particular, may
have been possible with a baseline that provided greater control
over the non-reasoning task processes, such as reading or making a
response. Also we were unable to differentiate between activation
associated with maintaining the structure of the array (ABCD)
when presented in correct order type (i), as compared to the shuf-
fled order type (ii) which should pose greater integration demands.
These cognitive demands appeared not to require differential brain
activity within this design. However, this investigation may have
been improved if the design had allowed a greater number of
examples of each type.
In conclusion, we have shown that reasoning with naturalistic
linear orders in humans is subserved by a similar network of brain
regions, including hippocampus, parietal, and prefrontal cortices,
as compared to reasoning with purely abstract information found
in previous studies. As predicted, sub-clinically depressed partic-
ipants demonstrated higher activation of parietal areas during a
test, and the learning, of presented and inferred relations, possibly
reflecting a different strategy of task execution.
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